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The papers collected here adopt a range of theoreti-
cal frameworks and address various phenomena drawn 
from many languages. Despite this diversity, they are 
united by a focus on the formal properties of phonologi-
cal computation, or rather by the position that in an use-
ful sense phonology is just a formal computational system 
involving operations whose symbolic arguments (features, 
syllables, etc.) are transduced to and from articulatory 
movements and percepts in a manner that is encapsu-
lated from phonology proper. This position is sometimes 
referred to as “substance-free phonology”(SFP, e.g. Reiss, 
2017). SFP does not suggest that the phonological symbols 
have no systematic relation to their phonetic “substance”, 
but just that a model of phonological computation should 
make no reference to such substance. Without quibbling 
over the exact meaning of “semantics”, the SFP position 
appears to be captured by Brian Cantwell Smith’s (1998) 
discussion of cognition and computation in general:
Because formal symbol manipulation is usually defined 
as “manipulation of symbols independent of their 
interpretation”, some people believe that the formal 
symbol manipulation construal of computation does 
not rest on a theory of semantics. But that is simply 
an elementary, though apparently very common, con-
ceptual mistake.[...] Symbols must have a  semantics 
—i.e., have an actual interpretation, be interpretable, 
whatever— in order for there to be something substan-
tive for their formal manipulation to proceed indepen-
dently of (p. 15).
So, a theory of phonological rules might specify a 
syntax for segment deletion, but it won’t formalize the 
deletion of nasals differently from the deletion of laterals, 
aside from using different symbols to refer to these two 
classes of segments.
 Given their concern with the formal properties of pho-
nological systems as components of I-languages, it is not 
surprising that the papers all struggle with very dry, basic 
questions rather than the large-scale typological and pho-
netic tendencies discussed under the rubric of markedness 
theory in much of the phonology literature. Morris Halle 
(1978) points out that the formalist approach is not always 
appreciated, but he defends it: “the attitude that formal, 
theoretical work is bound to be both ad-hoc and sterile is, 
I am convinced, fundamentally mistaken” (p. 530). 
The papers here all adopt the perspective that “a for-
malized theory may automatically provide solutions for 
many problems other than those for which it was explic-
itly designed” and that “[o]bscure and intuition-bound 
notions can neither lead to absurd conclusions nor pro-
vide new and correct ones, and hence they fail to be useful 
in two important respects” (Chomsky, 1957, p. 5). 
The idea of formalization may suggest complex math-
ematical analysis, advanced logic or sophisticated statisti-
cal modeling, but the papers in this collection are asking 
very ‘old-fashioned’ questions (e.g. how should feature-
filling processes be modeled) and using ‘old-fashioned’ 
tools (like basic set theory) to address them. In this regard, 
the papers gathered here all strike me as consistent with 
the humble journeyman approach to the pursuit of knowl-
edge advocated by Francis Bacon (1620, Book 61):
As the saying goes: a lame man on the right road out-
strips the runner who takes a wrong one. Indeed, it 
is obvious that a man on the wrong road goes fur-
ther astray the faster he runs. You might think that in 
claiming to be able to do better in the sciences than 
they did, I must in some way be setting myself  up as 
brighter than they are; but it is not so. The course 
I propose for discovery in the sciences leaves little to 
the acuteness and strength of intelligence, but puts all 
intelligences nearly on a level. My plan is exactly like 
the drawing of a straight line or a perfect circle: to do 
it free-hand you need a hand that is steady and prac-
tised, but if  you use a ruler or a compass you will need 
little if  anything else; and my method is just like that.
The reader will have to decide if the commitment to 
formalization and the modest toolkits invoked in these 
papers do indeed pay off. 
